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Abstract
In	terrestrial	and	coastal	systems,	the	mitigation	hierarchy	is	widely	and	increasingly	
used	to	guide	actions	to	ensure	that	no	net	loss	of	biodiversity	ensues	from	develop-
ment.	We	develop	a	conceptual	model	which	applies	this	approach	to	the	mitigation	
of	marine	megafauna	by-	catch	in	fisheries,	going	from	defining	an	overarching	goal	
with	an	associated	quantitative	target,	through	avoidance,	minimization,	remediation	
to	offsetting.	We	demonstrate	the	framework’s	utility	as	a	tool	for	structuring	think-
ing	and	exposing	uncertainties.	We	draw	comparisons	between	debates	ongoing	in	
terrestrial	 situations	 and	 in	 by-	catch	 mitigation,	 to	 show	 how	 insights	 from	 each	
could	 inform	the	other;	these	are	the	hierarchical	nature	of	mitigation,	out-	of-	kind	
offsets,	research	as	an	offset,	incentivizing	implementation	of	mitigation	measures,	
societal	limits	and	uncertainty.	We	explore	how	economic	incentives	could	be	used	
throughout	 the	hierarchy	 to	 improve	 the	achievement	of	by-	catch	goals.	We	con-
clude	by	highlighting	the	importance	of	clear	agreed	goals,	of	thinking	beyond	single	
species	and	 individual	 jurisdictions	 to	account	 for	complex	 interactions	and	policy	
leakage,	of	taking	uncertainty	explicitly	into	account	and	of	thinking	creatively	about	
approaches	 to	by-	catch	mitigation	 in	order	 to	 improve	outcomes	 for	conservation	
and	fishers.	We	suggest	that	the	framework	set	out	here	could	be	helpful	in	support-
ing	efforts	to	 improve	by-	catch	mitigation	efforts	and	highlight	the	need	for	a	full	
empirical	application	to	substantiate	this.
K E Y W O R D S
albatrosses,	biodiversity	offsetting,	economic	incentives,	no	net	loss,	sharks	and	rays,	turtles
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1  | INTRODUC TION
The	goal	 of	 no	net	 loss	 (NNL)	of	 biodiversity	 from	economic	de-
velopment	 is	 becoming	widely	 adopted	 by	 national	 governments	
and	 international	 lenders,	 potentially	 offering	 a	 method	 to	 limit	
the	 impacts	 of	 environmental	 damage	 in	 terrestrial	 and	 coastal	
systems	(BBOP	2012,	IFC	2012).	Several	large	multinational	com-
panies	have	signed	up	to	NNL,	or	even	to	producing	a	net	gain	of	
biodiversity	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 activities	 (Bull	&	Brownlie,	 2017;	
Rainey	et	al.,	2015).	Generally,	NNL	is	assured	by	the	use	of	a	mit-
igation	 hierarchy,	 often	 applied	 as	 part	 of	 an	 Environmental	 and	
Social	Impact	Assessment	(ESIA).	The	mitigation	hierarchy	requires	
that	project	proponents	first	avoid	doing	harm	to	biodiversity,	for	
example	 by	 sitting	 the	 development	 away	 from	 particularly	 sen-
sitive	 areas.	 Subsequently,	while	 carrying	out	 their	 development,	
they	should	minimize	 the	harm	done,	 for	example	by	 limiting	 the	
footprint	 of	 heavy	machinery	 to	 specific	 areas	 and	 not	 polluting	
watercourses.	They	then	remediate	the	biodiversity	loss	within	the	
development	 footprint,	 for	 example	 by	 replanting	 cleared	 areas	
post-	development.	The	final	step	is	to	offset	any	residual	additional	
damage	 caused	 by	 their	 development	 through	 improvement	 of	
biodiversity	elsewhere	(Gardner	et	al.,	2013),	using	a	range	of	ap-
proaches,	for	example	digging	new	ponds	or	clearing	invasive	veg-
etation	in	an	adjacent	site	(Bull,	Hardy,	Moilanen,	&	Gordon,	2015).	
Offsetting	 is	a	particularly	controversial	element	of	the	hierarchy	
because	it	requires	acceptance	of	a	development	that	harms	biodi-
versity	 in	a	given	location	and	assumes	that	 it	 is	possible	to	com-
pensate	for	this	harm	by	biodiversity	enhancement	elsewhere	(e.g.	
Maron	 et	al.,	 2016).	More	 generally,	 there	 is	much	 debate	 about	
whether	NNL	 is	attainable,	and	how	 it	 should	be	 implemented	 in	
practice	(most	recently	explored	by	Bull,	Lloyd,	&	Strange,	2017).
Despite	its	growing	use	in	terrestrial	and	coastal	environments,	
the	mitigation	hierarchy	has	not	been	so	widely	applied	 in	near-
shore	and	high	seas	marine	settings,	and	many	questions	about	its	
application	in	the	ocean	remain	(Squires	&	Garcia,	in	press,	UNEP-	
WCMC	2016).	Marine	 experience	 to	 date	 has	mostly	 concerned	
coastal	development,	for	example	relating	to	windfarms,	urban	de-
velopment,	aquaculture	and	ports,	rather	than	in	the	capture	fish-
eries	arena	(e.g.	Kyriazi,	Lejano,	Maes,	&	Degraer,	2015;	Vaissière,	
Levrel,	 Pioch,	 &	 Carlier,	 2014).	 The	 four	 steps	 of	 the	mitigation	
hierarchy	are	discussed	in	fisheries,	however,	and	as	in	the	terres-
trial	literature,	the	option	of	offsetting	is	particularly	controversial	
(e.g.	the	debate	around	Wilcox	&	Donlan,	2007	analysis	of	the	po-
tential	for	offsetting	seabird	by-	catch	by	invasive	species	eradica-
tion	on	nesting	islands;	Finkelstein	et	al.,	2008;	Wilcox	&	Donlan,	
2009;	Žydelis,	Wallace,	Gilman,	&	Werner,	2009).	The	use	of	eco-
nomic	incentives	to	reduce	the	amount	or	impact	of	by-	catch	has	
received	attention	but	has	also	not	yet	been	fully	explored	(Dutton	
&	Squires,	2008;	Gjertsen,	Squires,	Dutton,	&	Eguchi,	2014;	Innes,	
Pascoe,	 Wilcox,	 Jennings,	 &	 Paredes,	 2015).	 The	 current	 FAO	
International	Guidelines	on	Bycatch	Management	and	Reduction	
of	Discards	mention	economic	incentives	only	briefly	(as	the	only	
economic	 instrument)	 and	 refer	 only	 to	 incentives	 to	 promote	
innovation	in	gear	technology	(FAO	2011).	Many	questions	remain	
as	 to	whether	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 apply	 the	mitigation	 hierarchy	 to	
marine	by-	catch,	and	what	measures	could	be	used	to	incentivize	
action	at	each	stage	in	the	hierarchy.	In	particular,	there	is	a	need	
for	a	conceptual	framework	that	integrates	the	range	of	by-	catch	
mitigation	measures,	and	the	approaches	used	to	incentivize	them,	
in	an	holistic	way.
This	 article	 explores	 application	 of	 the	mitigation	 hierarchy	 to	
address	 a	 specific	 fishery	 concern,	 that	 of	marine	megafauna	 by-	
catch.	We	take	“marine	megafauna”	to	encompass	long-	lived	species	
with	low	reproductive	rates	which	are	therefore	potentially	sensitive	
to	by-	catch,	for	example	marine	mammals,	turtles,	seabirds	and	large	
fish,	while	we	define	by-	catch	as	catch	which	is	not	directly	targeted	
(bearing	 in	mind	 the	complexities	 in	definition	highlighted	by	FAO	
2011).	We	 limit	 our	 discussion	 to	marine	megafauna	 by-	catch	 for	
manageability	of	scope,	and	because	this	issue	is	of	particular	con-
cern	within	 both	 the	 conservation	 and	 fisheries	 realms.	However,	
many	of	the	points	we	raise	are	applicable	to	by-	catch	more	broadly.	
It	 is	also	the	issue	for	which	discussion	of	the	applicability	of	NNL	
and	the	mitigation	hierarchy	to	marine	systems	has	been	particularly	
active	(e.g.	following	the	paper	by	Wilcox	&	Donlan,	2007).
First,	 we	 outline	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 for	 by-	catch	mitiga-
tion,	based	on	 the	application	of	a	 sequential	mitigation	hierarchy	
to	achieve	NNL.	We	then	discuss	some	key	issues	that	arise	in	the	
application	of	a	mitigation	hierarchy	to	marine	megafauna	by-	catch,	
and	relate	them	to	the	equivalent	debate	 in	the	terrestrial	setting.	
We	move	on	to	consider	how	incentives	to	mitigate	the	amount	or	
impact	 of	 by-	catch	 can	 be	 used	 to	 support	 the	 application	 of	 the	
framework.	Finally,	we	sum	up	 the	potential	of	our	 framework	 for	
improving	by-	catch	mitigation	outcomes.
2  | CONCEPTUAL FR AME WORK FOR  
BY-  C ATCH REDUC TION
To	clarify	how	achieving	NNL	through	a	mitigation	hierarchy	would	
work	 for	 marine	 megafauna	 by-	catch,	 we	 present	 a	 conceptual	
framework	relating	to	the	target	level	of	by-	catch	impact	in	a	fishery.	
The	approach	can	operate	at	a	range	of	levels	from	the	global	to	the	
stock	 to	 the	 individual	animal.	The	most	usual,	 and	most	 intuitive,	
scale	at	which	NNL	could	apply	to	by-	catch	is	at	the	scale	of	a	fish-
ery,	targeting	a	given	stock	or	set	of	stocks,	so	this	is	the	scale	we	
use	in	this	exploration.	Table	1	explains	the	terms	we	use	to	describe	
the	conceptual	framework.
The	 approach	 starts	 by	 defining the goal	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 desired	
change	in	biodiversity;	this	is	commonly	taken	to	be	NNL	of	biodiver-
sity	but	that	is	not	necessarily	the	only	goal.	For	example,	in	the	ter-
restrial	realm,	net	gain	is	a	widely	used	goal	(Rainey	et	al.,	2015),	while	
in	 the	marine	 realm,	by-	catch	minimization	 is	often	 the	policy	goal	
(except	for	totally	protected	species),	which	may	imply	a	net	loss	or	
gain	in	biodiversity,	depending	on	the	current	by-	catch	level.	Another	
potential	goal	could	be	population	recovery	 (cf	 the	US	Endangered	
Species	Act;	Wolf,	Hartl,	Carroll,	Neel,	&	Greenwald,	2015).
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The	next	step	is	to	define	a	quantitative	target	and	associated	
metric	by	which	the	goal	will	be	measured.	In	the	case	of	by-	catch	
of	marine	megafauna,	 one	 relatively	 intuitive	 approach	 is	 to	 de-
fine	 the	 target	 as	 zero	 net	 change	 in	 population	 growth	 rate	 of	
the	 focal	 species	 caused	 as	 a	 result	 of	 by-	catch	 and	 associated	
mitigation	measures,	 in	the	context	of	all	the	other	factors	 influ-
encing	that	population	(as	was	done,	e.g.,	in	the	studies	reviewed	
by	Lewison,	Crowder,	Read,	&	Freeman,	2004).	The	downside	of	
this	 metric	 is	 its	 requirement	 for	 monitoring	 data	 that	 can	 pro-
vide	 trends	 in	 population	 size	 over	 time,	 decomposed	 into	 vital	
rates	(survival,	fecundity)	so	that	the	contribution	of	by-	catch	and	
mitigation	measures	 to	change	 in	population	growth	 rate	can	be	
discerned.	 This	may	 be	 challenging	 for	many	marine	megafauna	
(Caswell,	Brault,	Read,	&	Smith,	1998).	Other	more	 readily	mon-
itored	 targets	 could	be	based	on	numbers	of	 animals,	 for	 exam-
ple	not	exceeding	a	Potential	Biological	Removal	(PBR)	threshold	
(Richard	&	Abraham,	2013).	The	downside	of	numbers-	based	met-
rics	is	their	more	indirect	relationship	with	the	conservation	status	
of	the	species	concerned.
Using	 the	metric	 of	 net	 change	 in	 population	 growth	 rate,	 the	
baseline	from	which	gains	and	losses	from	different	measures	taken	
to	mitigate	by-	catch	are	assessed	could	be:	a	zero	population	growth	
rate	such	that	the	population	remains	stable	at	the	current	level	(a	
static	 baseline);	 the	 projected	 population	 growth	 rate	 of	 the	 spe-
cies	in	the	absence	of	by-	catch,	which	could	be	positive	or	negative	
depending	on	the	relative	importance	of	by-	catch	in	the	context	of	
other	threats	(a	dynamic	baseline);	or	an	aspirational	baseline,	such	
as	population	growth	at	X%	per	year	to	the	point	at	which	it	reaches	
some	desired	steady-	state	abundance	(which	would	need	to	be	dy-
namic	given	that	populations	have	density-	dependent	growth).	Such	
a	baseline	 is	 therefore	 a	 type	of	counterfactual,	 against	which	any	
improvement	 or	 deterioration	 in	 the	 population	 of	 the	 by-	caught	
species	as	a	result	of	the	implementation	of	the	mitigation	hierarchy	
is	compared	(i.e.	what	would	have	happened	in	the	absence	of	the	
by-	catch	mitigation	measures).
Next,	 the	 different	 approaches	 which	 can	 be	 used	 to	 attain	
NNL	(or	whatever	goal	 is	set)	are	assessed	 in	terms	of	their	effect	
on	the	chosen	metric;	for	example,	the	reduction	in	seabird	mortal-
ity	from	fitting	tori	lines	in	a	fishery	can	be	assessed	in	terms	of	its	
effect	on	the	growth	rate	of	a	wandering	albatross	(Diomedea exu-
lans,	Diomedeidae)	population.	The	four	categories	of	the	terrestrial	
mitigation	hierarchy	are	avoidance,	minimization,	remediation	(also	
known	 as	 restoration	 or	 rebuilding)	 and	 offsetting.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
marine	megafauna	by-	catch,	we	take	“avoidance”	to	represent	mea-
sures	taken	in	order	to	reduce	the	probability	of	encounter	between	
potentially	 harmful	 gear	 and	 a	 potentially	 by-	caught	 individual,	
by	 separating	 fishing	 activity	 from	 individuals	 or	 stocks	 of	 poten-
tial	megafauna	by-	catch	 species	 (see	Table	2	 for	 example	 actions).	
We	 take	 “minimization”	 as	measures	which	 reduce	 the	probability	
of	capture	by	the	gear	given	that	the	encounter	cannot	be	realisti-
cally	“avoided”.	These	measures	occur	once	there	is	spatio-	temporal	
overlap	between	a	 fishing	vessel	and	a	marine	megafauna	 individ-
ual.	“Remediation”	also	occurs	at	sea,	but	post-	capture,	and	aims	to	
reduce	 the	probability	of	mortality	 given	capture.	 “Offsetting”	 re-
fers	to	measures	to	compensate	for	by-	catch	mortality	that	operate	
separately	from	the	focal	fishing	activity,	but	which	target	the	same	
stock	of	the	by-	caught	species.
In	reality,	there	are	grey	areas	between	each	of	these	stages,	and	
a	range	of	ways	in	which	by-	catch	mitigation	measures	can	be	cat-
egorized.	For	example,	 here	we	 include	 restoration	and	 rebuilding	
activities	at	 the	stock	 level	 in	“offsetting”,	because	our	framework	
is	 structured	around	 individual-	level	capture	probability.	However,	
another	approach	might	be	to	combine	remediation	at	the	 individ-
ual	level	in	a	category	with	restoration/rebuilding	measures	that	im-
prove	population	viability	at	the	stock	level,	such	as	restocking	and	
habitat	improvement,	leaving	offsetting	as	measures	which	benefit	
Term Explanation
Goal The	desired	change	in	biodiversity,	for	example	no	net	loss	(NNL)	of	
biodiversity	as	a	result	of	the	combined	effect	of	the	damaging	action	(e.g.	
by-	catch)	and	associated	mitigation	measures
Target In	our	framework,	we	distinguish	between	the	overall	goal	at	the	policy	level	
(e.g.	NNL),	and	the	quantitative	target	which	operationalizes	the	goal,	for	
which	a	metric	can	be	defined
Metric The	units	used	to	measure	gains	and	losses	in	biodiversity,	in	order	to	
evaluate	whether	the	goal	has	been	achieved.	In	our	case,	this	is	net	change	
in	population	growth	rate	of	the	focal	species	as	a	result	of	by-	catch	+	
mitigation	measures
Baseline The	reference	point	against	which	NNL	is	assessed.	This	could	be	static	(e.g.	
current	population	growth	rate),	dynamic	(projected	population	growth	rate	
in	the	absence	of	by-	catch,	but	continuation	of	other	processes	affecting	
vital	rates),	or	aspirational	(desired	change	in	population	growth	rate)
Counterfactual The	projected	change	in	population	growth	rate	in	the	presence	of	by-	catch	
but	absence	of	mitigation	measures,	against	which	NNL	is	assessed	(e.g.	
business	as	usual).	If	the	baseline	is	dynamic,	the	counterfactual	is	the	same	
as	the	baseline;	otherwise,	both	are	required	to	fully	define	the	scenario	
against	which	NNL	is	evaluated
TABLE  1 Explanation	of	terms	used	in	
the	mitigation	hierarchy
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the	stock	more	indirectly	or	act	at	the	broader	species	level	(such	as	
restoration	 in	 other	 locations	 or	measures	 to	 improve	 compliance	
and	 reduce	 uncertainty).	 However,	we	 feel	 that	 the	 clarity	 of	 the	
probabilistic	approach	in	our	framework,	which	extends	the	classi-
fication	by	Hall	(1996),	is	particularly	helpful.
Our	division	of	mitigation	approaches	into	these	categories	can	
be	represented	in	the	following	conceptual	model,	relating	to	a	par-
ticular	by-	catch	species,	in	which	the	unit	is	rate	of	change	in	popu-
lation	size	as	a	result	of	by-	catch	and	its	mitigation:
Here,	ΔλT	 is	 the	 target	 level	of	overall	net	damage	 inflicted	by	
by-	catch	on	the	species	concerned,	measured	in	terms	of	change	in	
population	growth	rate	with	respect	to	the	agreed	baseline.	A	zero	
ΔλT	implies	that	the	reduction	in	population	growth	rate	caused	by	
by-	catch,	 after	 avoidance	 and	mitigation	measures	 have	 been	 im-
plemented,	is	balanced	by	the	gain	engendered	by	offset	measures.	
There	is	also	the	possibility	for	ΔλT	to	be	negative	(there	is	still	addi-
tional	population	decline	as	a	result	of	by-	catch,	even	after	measures	
to	reduce	it)	or	positive	(equivalent	to	net gain,	meaning	that	species	
population	growth	is	higher	than	it	would	otherwise	have	been,	as	
a	result	of	the	combination	of	measures	taken	under	the	mitigation	
hierarchy).
f(EB	×	BPUE)	is	the	effect	on	population	growth	rate	of	the	by-	
catch-	relevant	component	of	fishing	effort,	broken	down	into	the	
by-	catch-	relevant	effort	itself,	EB,	and	the	by-	catch	taken	per	unit	
of	 that	 effort,	 BPUE,	where	 f()	 is	 the	 effect	 of	 this	 effort	 on	 the	
by-	caught	 species’	 population	 dynamics.	 This	would	 generally	 be	
calculated	as	the	output	of	a	population	model.	A	reduction	 in	EB 
is	equivalent	to	a	fishery	avoiding	by-	catch,	partially	or	completely.	
It	 could	 include	 restricting	 the	 fishery	 to	 particular	 areas	 or	 sea-
sons,	 modification	 of	 fishing	 practices	 and	 operations	 (e.g.	 set-
ting	the	gear	deeper	to	avoid	depths	where	by-	caught	species	are	
prevalent).	A	reduction	in	BPUE	is	the	result	of	the	at-	sea	measures	
encompassed	 in	the	“minimize”	and	“remediate”	steps	of	the	miti-
gation	hierarchy.
By-	catch-	relevant	effort	EB	is	a	subset	of	the	overall	fishing	ef-
fort	 that	occurs	 in	 the	area	 in	which	there	 is	 risk	of	by-	catch	 (E).	
Given	 the	complexities	of	 estimating	EB,	 in	many	cases	 it	will	 be	
necessary	to	approximate	it	by	E	(e.g.	Tuck,	Polacheck,	&	Bulman,	
2003).	 This	may	 be	 problematic;	 for	 example,	 Báez	 et	al.	 (2007)	
show	 that	 loggerhead	 turtle	 (Caretta caretta,	 Cheloniidae)	 by-	
catch	in	the	Mediterranean	was	not	correlated	with	fishing	effort	
(measured	as	number	of	hooks);	by-	catch	was	instead	strongly	re-
lated	 to	distance	 from	 the	coast.	They	 suggest	 that	 this	was	not	
because	turtle	abundance	 is	a	 function	of	distance	 (which	would	
have	 implied	a	gradient	 in	EB),	 but	because	 fisher	behaviour	var-
ied,	although	they	left	investigation	of	the	mechanisms	for	further	
research.	BPUE	is	a	function	of	catchability	of	the	by-	caught	spe-
cies	as	well	as	EB;	 for	example,	Ward,	Lawrence,	Darbyshire,	and	
Hindmarsh	(2008)	carried	out	a	multispecies	analysis	of	the	effects	
of	 nylon	 leaders	 on	 catch	 rates	 and	 showed	 that	 catch	 reduced	
with	nylon	for	sharks,	blue	marlin	(Makaira nigricans,	Istiophoridae)	
and	 snake	 mackerel	 (Gempylus serpens,	 Gempylidae),	 and	 in-
creased	 for	 bigeye	 tuna	 (Thunnus obesus,	 Scombridae)	 and	 black	
marlin	(Istiompax indica,	Istiophoridae).	The	relationships	between	
E,	EB	 and	BPUE	are	 likely	 to	be	 complex	 and	 confounded.	There	
have	been	 limited	explorations	of	 these	 relationships	 in	by-	catch	
datasets,	which	 typically	 suffer	 from	 low	 sample	 sizes	 and	 zero-	
inflation	requiring	specialized	modelling	techniques	 (e.g.	 the	spa-
tially	explicit	Bayesian	hierarchical	models	of	Sims,	Cox,	&	Lewison,	
2008).	By-	catch	mitigation	may	use	a	suite	of	interacting	measures	
from	 several	 levels	 of	 the	 mitigation	 hierarchy	 (Table	2),	 which	
change	over	time,	adding	further	to	the	complexity	of	separating	E, 
EB	and	BPUE	(as	discussed	for	target	fishery	data	by	Bishop,	2006).	
We	do	not	here	attempt	further	to	clarify	these	relationships,	but	a	
key	research	need	is	to	disentangle	these	variables	in	an	empirical	
setting.
(1)ΔλT= f
(
EB×BPUE
)
−OT
Step of the 
hierarchy Example measures
Avoidance Excluding	fishing	from	the	areas	(no-	fishing	zones),	seasons	(closed	seasons)	or	
times	of	day	where	these	species	are	most	vulnerable
Minimization Using	on-	vessel	technologies	which	aim	to	reduce	the	number	of	encountered	
individuals	that	are	captured	during	fishing	operations,	such	as	tori	lines	for	
scaring	seabirds	away	from	longlines	or	sonic	devices	to	signal	nets	to	marine	
mammals
Remediation Devices	which	enable	individuals	to	release	themselves	from	the	gear	
(selectivity	grids,	turtle	excluder	devices)	or	to	be	released	(e.g.	Medina	
panels	operated	in	tuna	purse-	seine	fisheries	to	let	dolphins	escape	before	
getting	on	the	deck),	or	releasing	them	on	deck	and	providing	for	a	safe	
return	to	the	sea	(e.g.	a	large	mesh	soft	webbing	cargo	net	can	be	used	to	
“sieve”	a	ray	from	the	catch	and	lift	it	over	the	side	of	the	vessel;	Francis,	
2014)
Offsetting Eradicating	invasive	predators	on	islands	where	seabirds	nest,	restoring	
habitat,	restocking	with	hatchery-	raised	individuals,	improving	by-	catch	
performance	of	other	gear	types	in	the	area
TABLE  2 Examples	of	measures	which	
can	be	taken	under	each	step	of	the	
mitigation	hierarchy
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OT	 is	 the	 net	 effect	 on	 population	 growth	 rate	 of	 policies	
aiming	to	improve	the	overall	viability	of	the	by-	caught	species’	
population,	 representing	 “offsetting”	 of	 the	 damage	 caused.	 It	
represents	 the	 expected	 effects	 of	 measures	 to	 improve	 con-
ditions	 for	 individuals	 which	 would	 not	 have	 been	 at	 risk	 of	
by-	catch	 at	 that	 particular	 stage	 in	 their	 lives	 or	 location.	 For	
example,	 supplementation	 in	 nesting	 areas	 (for	 turtles);	 resto-
ration	of	nesting	habitat	(for	seabirds);	or	implementation	of	pro-
tected	areas	aimed	at	demographic	groups	not	directly	impacted	
by	 fishing	 (calving	 areas	 for	 cetaceans;	 juvenile	 concentrations	
for	fish).
3  | OPER ATIONALIZING THE FR AMEWORK
In	 Table	3,	we	 illustrate	 the	 application	 of	 the	 by-	catch	mitigation	
framework	 using	 four	 examples	 from	 different	 fisheries	 and	 by-	
catch	taxa.	Specific	solutions	to	Equation	1	could	come	from	taking	
into	account	 the	 regulatory,	 cultural	 and	economic	conditions	 in	a	
particular	fishery.	For	instance,	once	the	focal	by-	catch	population	
has	been	defined,	then	it	is	possible	to	solve	the	equation	by	assign-
ing	factors	affecting	decision-	making,	including	cost.	If	a	least-	cost	
approach	to	by-	catch	goals	is	appropriate,	EB,	BPUE	and	OT could be 
expressed	as	functions	of	cost	to	solve	the	equation	for	a	given	ΔλT. 
Another	 approach	would	 be	 to	maximize	ΔλT	 subject	 to	 a	 budget	
constraint.
Table	3	highlights	that	there	is	not	always	potential	for	effec-
tive	 action	 at	 each	 level	 of	 the	 hierarchy;	 for	 some	 species	 (e.g.	
oceanic	whitetips/longlines),	there	may	be	limited	potential	at	all	
levels.	The	framework	is	a	way	of	organizing	and	structuring	think-
ing	about	by-	catch	mitigation,	and	enabling	mitigation	effective-
ness	to	be	assessed	against	a	concretely	defined	and	measurable	
target.	Its	function	is	not	to	propose	new	ways	of	doing	by-	catch	
mitigation	for	cases	like	these.	If,	on	using	the	framework	to	anal-
yse	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 measures	 available	 for	 a	 given	 by-	
caught	stock,	it	is	found	that	it	is	not	possible	to	reach	the	chosen	
target	(e.g.	NNL),	then	difficult	decisions	must	be	made.	For	exam-
ple,	the	target	may	need	to	change,	which	could	imply	an	accep-
tance	of	continuing	decline	of	the	by-	caught	stock.	Or	the	fishery	
must	be	 restructured	 in	 a	way	 that	 reduces	by-	catch	effectively	
(maybe	even	closed	down).	Or	investment	must	be	made	into	tech-
nological	 innovation	 to	develop	new	ways	 to	 reduce	by-	catch.	 If	
it	is	found	that	the	data	are	inadequate	for	the	analysis	required,	
then	the	decision	must	be	made	either	to	invest	in	improving	the	
evidence	base	or	 to	 recognize	 that	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 evaluate	
whether	 by-	catch	 mitigation	 has	 been	 effective	 in	 reaching	 the	
agreed	 goal.	 The	 framework’s	main	 utility,	 therefore,	 is	 to	make	
these	choices	explicit.
Equation	1	could	be	extended	to	handle	multiple	species,	vary-
ing	gear	types,	or	heterogeneous	by-	catch	reduction	methods.	For	
instance,	BPUE	can	be	decomposed	into	several	components	repre-
senting	the	different	stages	of	the	process.	If	BPUE	represents	the	
sum	of	individuals	dead	on	arrival,	individuals	captured	and	dying	on	
the	vessel,	 and	 individuals	dying	after	 live	 release,	we	can	 rewrite	
BPUE	as	a	series	of	factors:
where	BDOA	is	the	by-	catch	per	unit	effort	that	arrives	to	the	boat	
dead,	BOB	is	the	by-	catch	per	unit	effort	that	arrives	to	the	vessel	
alive,	PDV	is	the	proportion	dying	on	the	vessel,	and	PDR	is	the	pro-
portion	dying	 after	 release.	 For	 instance,	 a	 higher	proportion	of	
by-	catch	of	sea	turtles	and	other	species	arrives	to	the	boat	dead	
when	using	longlines	that	are	set	deep,	such	as	those	used	for	big-
eye	tuna	that	can	be	set	more	than	300	m	deep,	when	compared	
to	 a	 shallow	 set	 longline	 such	 as	 those	 used	 in	many	 nearshore	
artisanal	 fisheries	 (Andraka	et	al.,	2013;	Hall,	Swimmer,	&	Parga,	
2012;	Swimmer	et	al.,	2006).	This	difference	would	appear	in	the	
BDOA	 term.	Such	a	decomposition	 illustrates	the	flexibility	of	this	
framework	in	handling	fishery-	and	species-	specific	features	and	
also	serves	to	highlight	areas	where	different	mitigation	methods	
would	have	the	greatest	influence	(e.g.	Shiode,	Hu,	Shiga,	Yokota,	
&	Tokai,	2005).	Another	extension	to	the	basic	framework	would	
be	to	consider	explicitly	the	uncertainty	surrounding	different	el-
ements	 of	 the	 conceptual	 model,	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 this	 uncer-
tainty	on	which	element	of	by-	catch	mitigation	should	be	a	focus	
(Table	3).
It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 this	 equation	 is	not	 a	 true	bioeco-
nomic	equation	to	be	solved.	Rather,	it	is	a	conceptual	framework	in	
which	we	make	the	components	of	the	mitigation	hierarchy	explicit,	
in	order	to	guide	thinking	towards	a	more	holistic	approach	to	ad-
dressing	by-	catch.	It	also	does	not	represent	a	hierarchy	such	as	is	
required	in	terrestrial	systems.	To	make	this	equation	into	a	hierar-
chy,	rather	than	a	model	for	least-	cost	mitigation	of	by-	catch,	it	could	
be	set	up	as	a	goal	programming	function,	with	sequential	solutions	
to	each	element,	summed	to	produce	the	final	mitigation	outcome.	In	
operational	terms,	this	translates	into	a	presumption	that	investment	
and	effort	should	be	focussed	differentially	on	sequential	elements	
of	the	model,	starting	with	EB,	then	BPUE,	then	OT,	so	that	offsetting	
relates	only	 to	 the	unavoidable	 residual	harm	once	all	 other	 steps	
have	been	taken.	This	may	be	reflected	 in	the	emphasis	placed	on	
the	incentives	given	to	fishers	to	change	behaviour	pertaining	to	se-
quential	elements	of	the	hierarchy,	in	the	timing	of	the	offset,	or	in	
the	disposition	of	the	funding	for	research	and	conservation	action	
allocated	by	government.
Research	is	currently	ongoing	to	operationalize	Equation	1	to	re-
duce	turtle	by-	catch	of	a	small-	scale	gillnet	fishery	operating	out	of	
San	Jose	port,	Peru	(Alfaro-	Shigueto	et	al.,	2010).	Currently,	a	small-	
scale	certification	scheme	is	under	trial	by	the	NGO	ProDelphinus,	
which	 aims	 to	 give	 premium	 prices	 for	 fish	 caught	 by	 skippers	
abiding	 by	 best-	practice	 by-	catch	 reduction	 guidelines	 (J.	 Alfaro-	
Shigueto	 and	 J.	 Mangel,	 personal	 communication).	 The	 research	
entails	collecting	detailed	economic	data	from	all	gillnet	vessels	to	
understand	 the	 economic	 costs	 involved	 in	 fishing	 operations,	 to	
calculate	the	potential	additional	costs	of	measures	at	each	stage	in	
(2)BPUE=BDOA+PDV×BOB+
(
1−PDV
)
×BOB×PDR
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the	mitigation	hierarchy.	 In	 the	absence	of	high	quality	population	
data	with	which	to	parameterize	a	model,	a	PBR-	based	approach	is	
being	used	to	set	a	target	by-	catch	level	 in	terms	of	number	of	 in-
dividuals	of	each	of	the	turtle	species	caught	in	the	fishery.	Expert	
opinion	from	fishers	and	Prodelphinus	staff,	supplemented	by	data	
from	a	long-	running	by-	catch	observer	programme	operating	out	of	
the	port	(Alfaro-	Shigueto	et	al.,	2011),	gives	the	potential	reduction	
in	turtle	by-	catch	numbers	as	a	result	of	a	given	mitigation	approach.	
Interviews	 and	 focus	 groups	 with	 fishers	 provide	 understanding	
of	 their	 preferences	 for	 different	 by-	catch	mitigation	 approaches,	
barriers	 and	 constraints	 to	 implementation,	 and	 potential	 partici-
pation	in	different	incentive	schemes;	this	can	be	supplemented	by	
Discrete	Choice	Experiments	providing	empirical	estimates	for	pref-
erences	for	combinations	of	by-	catch	reduction	measures	(cf	Rogers,	
2013).	This	field	research	produces	a	short-	list	of	feasible	mitigation	
measures	at	each	stage	in	the	mitigation	hierarchy,	for	costing	and	
testing	(e.g.	specific	areas	or	times	for	fishery	closure	under	avoid-
ance,	combinations	of	hook	types	and	net	modification	under	mini-
mization,	training	in	turtle	handling	and	release	for	remediation,	and	
improving	by-	catch	performance	of	other	gear	types	in	the	area	for	
offsetting).	This	enables	the	analysis	of	the	effectiveness	and	cost	
of	 various	 combinations	 of	 by-	catch	 reduction	 strategies,	 framed	
within	the	four	steps	of	the	mitigation	hierarchy	(avoid,	minimize,	re-
mediate,	offset),	with	a	clear	target	by-	catch	reduction	goal	in	mind.
4  | COMPARING KE Y DEBATES BET WEEN  
TERRESTRIAL NNL AND BY-  C ATCH  
MITIGATION
4.1 | The hierarchical nature of mitigation
Terrestrial	 situations	are	usually	viewed	as	 requiring	a	strict	hierar-
chy	with	avoidance,	minimization	and	remediation	taking	precedence	
over	offsets.	Part	of	the	reason	for	this	hierarchy	may	be	societal	val-
ues	and	expectations,	but	 also	 it	 is	 a	 reflection	of	 reversibility	 and	
uncertainty.	The	terrestrial	mitigation	hierarchy	was	set	up	to	address	
habitat	destruction	caused	by	development,	which	 is	effectively	 ir-
reversible,	hence	avoidance	is	strictly	preferred	from	a	conservation	
perspective.	 In	practice,	 avoidance	has	been	a	neglected	 step,	 and	
much	of	the	disquiet	about	biodiversity	offsetting	has	been	because	
of	the	tendency	to	pay	lip	service	to	avoidance	and	focus	instead	on	
offsets,	which	 then	may	 be	 implemented	 on	 paper	 only	 (Hough	&	
Robertson,	2009;	Phalan	et	al.,	2017).	Even	with	perfect	enforcement	
and	compliance	with	measures	further	down	the	mitigation	hierarchy,	
the	strict	avoidance	of	habitat	loss	is	more	certain	to	limit	impact	than	
reducing	losses	in	the	course	of	a	potentially	damaging	action,	which	
is	more	certain	than	restoring	damage	after	the	fact	or	compensating	
for	it	with	actions	elsewhere.	Often	in	terrestrial	systems	multipliers	
are	used	at	the	offset	stage	to	reflect	this	uncertainty,	requiring	that	
an	additional	amount	of	equivalent	land	is	protected	in	an	offset	over	
and	above	the	amount	that	is	lost	during	the	development	(with	the	
ratio	of	land	offset	to	land	destroyed	in	the	10	s	to	100	s	depending	
on	the	circumstances;	Moilanen,	Van	Teeffelen,	Ben-	Haim,	&	Ferrier,	F
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2009).	By	contrast,	in	fisheries	settings	there	have	been	suggestions	
that,	depending	on	the	legal	environment,	it	may	be	more	appropriate	
for	offsets	to	be	used	as	part	of	a	least-	cost	conservation	approach	
alongside	more	traditional	mitigation	methods,	rather	than	as	the	last	
step	 in	a	mitigation	hierarchy	 (Dutton,	Joseph,	Squires,	&	Williams,	
2011;	Dutton	&	Squires,	2008;	Wilcox	&	Donlan,	2007).
4.2 | Out- of- kind offsets
Out-	of-	kind	 offsets	 are	 those	 which	 do	 not	 act	 to	 increase	 the	
impact-	affected	biodiversity.	In	terms	of	our	conceptual	framework,	
they	are	offsets	which	do	not	act	to	increase	the	population	growth	
rate	of	the	by-	catch-	affected	focal	population	(Equation	1).	For	ex-
ample,	one	suggested	benefit	of	 raising	 funds	 for	offsetting	 from	
a	by-	catch	tax	on	fishers	is	that	the	proceeds	from	such	a	tax	can	
finance	offsets	elsewhere	within	the	range	of	the	by-	catch-	affected	
population	 (Dutton	 &	 Squires,	 2008):	 Although	 not	 a	 true	 offset	
under	a	mitigation	hierarchy,	funds	from	the	California	drift	gillnet	
industry	 in	 2002	 financed	 sea	 turtle	 nesting	 site	 conservation	 in	
Baja	California	for	compensatory	mitigation	of	sea	turtle	by-	catch	
(Jannise,	 Squires,	 Seminoff,	 &	 Dutton,	 2010).	 In	 terrestrial	 (and	
marine)	systems,	 it	can	be	more	challenging	to	define	the	 impact-	
affected	 biodiversity,	 because	 impact	 is	 rarely	 as	 clearly	 linked	
to	a	given	species	and	stock	as	 it	 is	 for	by-	catch.	Because	of	this,	
the	location	and	biodiversity	target	of	conservation	actions	falling	
under	the	“offset”	heading	has	sometimes	been	loosely	related	to	
the	actual	 impact.	Best-	practice	standards	state	that	offsets	must	
be	implemented	as	close	to	the	damaging	activities	as	possible	and	
focus	on	biodiversity	as	similar	as	possible	to	that	which	has	been	
impacted	 (BBOP	 2012).	 However,	 there	 have	 also	 been	 calls	 for	
“out-	of-	kind”	offsets	that	give	more	conservation	bang-	for-	buck	by	
focussing	on	threatened	species	or	rare	habitats,	or	areas	in	need	
of	conservation,	 rather	 than	 the	 impacted	areas	or	 species	which	
may	 be	 considered	 less	 “valuable”	 for	 conservation	 (Bull,	 Hardy	
et	al.,	2015).	This	has	led	to	substantial	debate	as	to	the	appropri-
ate	limits	on	the	geographic	scale	and	biodiversity	focus	for	offset-
ting	(e.g.	Apostolopoulou	&	Adams,	2017).	It	also	draws	attention	to	
the	subjective	and	user-	defined	nature	of	 the	word	 “biodiversity”	
(Morar,	 Toadvine,	&	Bohannan,	 2015).	 As	 it	 is	 impossible	 fully	 to	
operationalize	the	concept,	implementers	of	the	mitigation	hierar-
chy	have	latitude	to	interpret	biodiversity	according	to,	for	example,	
ease	of	measurement,	 perceived	 societal	 value	or	mitigation	 cost	
(Maron	 et	al.,	 2016).	 In	 our	 case,	we	 take	 a	 narrow	 focus	 on	 the	
by-	caught	species	 itself;	 this	 is	 in	 line	with	much	of	 the	 literature	
on	 by-	catch,	 but	 not	with	 the	 broader	 discourses	 on	 ecosystem-	
based	approaches	to	marine	management	and	ecosystem	services	
(Rosenberg	&	McLeod,	2005).	These	discourses	suggest	 the	need	
for	a	more	functional,	ecosystem-	based	approach	to	no	net	loss	of	
biodiversity;	this	has	yet	to	transpire	either	in	the	marine	or	in	the	
terrestrial	literature,	possibly	because	substantial	challenges	in	de-
fining	impact-	affected	biodiversity	then	inevitably	ensue.
As	marine	megafauna	 stocks	 are	 often	 transboundary	 and	mi-
gratory,	defining	the	appropriate	spatial	unit	 for	offsetting	may	be	
a	challenge	because	 the	most	effective	 location	 for	an	offset	may	
or	may	not	be	within	the	area	of	influence	of	a	given	fishery.	Clearly	
and	precisely	defining	 the	 spatial	 unit	within	which	 the	mitigation	
hierarchy	will	 be	 implemented,	 during	 the	process	 of	 defining	 the	
overall	goal	(such	as	NNL),	is	vital.	This	unit	should	reflect	the	scale	
over	which	an	action	will	affect	λT;	offsets	which	are	within	the	dis-
tribution	of	the	focal	stock	of	the	by-	caught	species	(as	defined	for	
Equation	1)	are	not	out-	of-	kind.	However,	challenges	emerge	when	
the	 appropriate	 spatial	 unit	 for	 offsetting	 activities	 is	 different	 to	
the	appropriate	spatial	unit	for	other	elements	of	the	mitigation	hi-
erarchy,	which	are	likely	to	be	defined	instead	by	jurisdictional	area	
or	 target	 fish	 stock	 distribution.	 In	many	 fisheries,	 the	 species	 af-
fected	by	by-	catch	may	not	be	well	enough	known,	and	offsets	may	
accordingly	need	to	be	broadly	targeted	to	benefit	any	potentially	
affected	species.	True	out-	of-	kind	offsets	would	include	funding	the	
conservation	of	unaffected	species	or	stocks,	of	habitats	not	used	
by	the	focal	stock,	or	contributions	to	a	conservation	fund	without	a	
clear	commitment	that	the	funds	are	to	be	spent	on	increasing	λT for 
the	focal	by-	caught	stock.	These	are	unlikely	to	form	part	of	best-	
practice	guidance	for	by-	catch	offsets.
4.3 | Research as an offset
A	related	area	of	active	controversy	for	marine	by-	catch	is	whether	
research	or	 information	gathering	should	be	seen	as	a	valid	offset	
mechanism.	 The	 rationale	 is	 that	 this	 research	 could	 be	 used	 to	
reduce	uncertainty,	promote	 innovation	and	 thereby	 improve	out-
comes	 for	 by-	caught	 species,	 albeit	 indirectly.	 An	 offset	 could	 be	
used	to	 incentivize	better	data	collection,	for	 instance,	using	a	by-	
catch	levy	to	pay	for	tagging	or	to	put	by-	catch	observers	or	elec-
tronic	monitoring	systems	on	boats.	This	might	be	a	prelude	to	later	
mitigation	 or	 avoidance	 activities	 once	 more	 is	 known	 about	 the	
biological	 setting.	Whether	 research	 activities	 could	 appropriately	
be	considered	as	part	of	an	“offset”	is	controversial—in	some	cases,	
an	 indirect	benefit	 to	 the	by-	caught	 stock	might	be	 clearly	 appar-
ent	(e.g.	the	oceanic	whitetip	(Carcharinus longimanus,	Carcharinidae)	
case-	study	in	Table	3),	while	in	other	cases	using	investment	in	re-
search	as	an	offset	could	be	seen	as	a	case	of	moral	hazard,	poten-
tially	 compromising	 scientists’	 independence	 and	 having	 at	 best	 a	
highly	indirect	relationship	to	NNL	of	the	by-	caught	species.	Another	
view	is	that	reducing	uncertainty	is	a	core	responsibility	of	operating	
a	fishery,	which	therefore	should	be	borne	by	the	management	au-
thority	or	fishing	businesses.	In	terrestrial	systems,	these	dilemmas	
also	exist,	but	the	sentiment	is	much	more	clearly	expressed	that	re-
search	activities	are	not	appropriate	offsets	(Bull,	Gordon,	Watson,	
&	Maron,	2016).
4.4 | Incentivizing implementation of mitigation  
measures
The	factors	that	drive	decision-	making	about	megafauna	by-	catch	
reduction	 (by	 skippers,	 companies,	 fishery	 managers,	 policymak-
ers	 and	 other	 stakeholders)	 include	 legal	 obligations	 to	minimize	
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by-	catch	 at	 the	 national	 or	 international	 levels	 (e.g.	 FAO,	 2011;	
Rice,	 2014),	 the	 availability	 and	 quality	 of	 technical	 fixes,	 associ-
ated	costs	 to	fishers,	 limits	on	access	to	seafood	markets,	as	well	
as	societal	pressures.	However,	much	research	on	by-	catch	reduc-
tion	 focuses	 on	 identifying	 and	 implementing	 technical	measures	
to	 reduce	BPUE,	 rather	 than	on	 the	 social	 and	economic	barriers	
to	 implementation	 (Campbell	 &	 Cornwell,	 2008).	 Technological	
innovation	 to	 improve	 BPUE	 needs	 to	 be	 appropriately	 incentiv-
ized,	with	efforts	made	to	ensure	that	such	measures	are	as	cost-	
effective	 as	 possible	 for	 fishers	 (Gjertsen,	 Hall,	 &	 Squires,	 2010;	
Lent	 &	 Squires,	 2017).	 However,	 it	 often	 happens	 that	 even	 ap-
parently	 suitable	 by-	catch	measures	 are	 not	widely	 implemented	
(e.g.	 Damalas	 &	 Vassilopoulou,	 2013;	 Orphanides	 &	 Palka,	 2013;	
Radzio,	Smolinsky,	&	Roosenburg,	2013).	In	these	cases,	the	degree	
of	non-	implementation,	and	the	reasons	behind	it,	needs	to	be	un-
derstood	so	it	can	be	addressed	(Cox	et	al.,	2007).	These	types	of	
consideration	are	also	not	well	researched	in	the	terrestrial	offset-
ting	literature,	because	compliance	is	poorly	monitored	(Bull,	Suttle,	
Gordon,	Singh,	&	Milner-	Gulland,	2013),	and	there	is	little	support	
for	 research	on	 the	barriers	 to	 implementation	of	a	mitigation	hi-
erarchy,	and	how	to	support	developers	to	address	these	barriers	
(Bull,	Bryant,	Baker,	&	Milner-	Gulland,	2015).	The	social	impacts	of	
implementing	a	biodiversity	mitigation	hierarchy	on	resource	users	
are	mentioned	 in	guidance	 (e.g.	BBOP	2012)	but	how	to	measure	
and	account	for	them	is	very	poorly	understood.	The	few	studies	in-
vestigating	delivery	of	promised	offset	measures	in	terrestrial	sys-
tems	suggest	a	very	poor	record	(Quétier,	Regnery,	&	Levrel,	2014).	
Therefore,	 the	 social	 side	 of	 implementing	 the	 mitigation	 hierar-
chy	and	 incentivizing	compliance	 is	an	area	 that	needs	more,	 and	
more	active,	research	within	both	the	terrestrial	and	marine	realms	
(Fulton,	Smith,	Smith,	&	van	Putten,	2011).	This	is	particularly	true	
when	the	burden	of	 implementing	mitigation	approaches	 is	borne	
by	relatively	small-	scale	producers	rather	than	governments	or	mul-
tinationals	(e.g.	the	pelagic	longline	fisheries	in	Table	3).
4.5 | Societal limits
For	a	species	at	high	risk	of	extinction,	complete	avoidance	of	by-	
catch	might	be	the	most	desirable	policy	from	both	a	management	
agency	 and	 societal	 perspective.	 In	 addition,	 with	 emblematic	 or	
highly	threatened	marine	megafauna	it	may	be	viewed	by	members	
of	 the	 public	 as	morally	wrong	 to	 kill	 any	 individuals	 even	 if	miti-
gation	is	in	place	(e.g.	Maui’s	dolphin;	Hamner	et	al.,	2014),	 leading	
to	pressure	on	governments	to	reflect	this	ethical	concern	in	regu-
lations.	These	dilemmas	echo	 the	 issue	of	 thresholds	 in	 terrestrial	
offsets,	which	recognizes	that	there	are	some	critical	areas	in	which	
development	is	not	societally	appropriate,	regardless	of	the	poten-
tial	for	mitigation,	and	other	areas	in	which	the	mitigation	hierarchy	
can	 be	 appropriately	 applied	 (Bull	 et	al.,	 2013).	 Examples	 of	 loca-
tions	where	a	threshold	approach	 is	seen	as	appropriate	 in	terres-
trial	 systems	 include	 the	 habitat	 of	 highly	 endangered	 species,	 or	
ecosystems	which	 are	 limited	 in	 extent	 and	 irreplaceable	 (such	 as	
old	growth	forest).	 In	 terrestrial	systems,	 therefore,	 the	mitigation	
hierarchy	is	seen	as	most	appropriate	for	application	in	more	com-
mon	and	degraded	habitats	such	as	farmland.	Similarly,	in	fisheries,	
there	may	be	some	situations	in	which	the	stocks	subject	to	by-	catch	
are	 so	 precious	 or	 threatened	 that	 no	 level	 of	 threat	 from	 fishing	
can	be	contemplated,	and	others	where	fishing	subject	to	NNL	and	
the	mitigation	hierarchy	is	a	socially	acceptable	approach.	In	situa-
tions	 in	which	 trade-	offs	 between	 conservation	 and	 development	
are	seen	as	necessary	or	acceptable	by	wider	society,	a	social	licence	
to	operate	may	be	gained	through	adopting	offsets	in	the	absence	of	
regulation.	For	example,	in	sub-	Saharan	Africa,	several	large	devel-
opment	projects	are	attempting	to	offset	their	impacts	on	great	apes	
and	their	habitats	(Kormos	et	al.,	2014).	A	by-	catch	equivalent	might	
be	 fishing	 companies	 voluntarily	 donating	 funds	 for	 turtle	 nesting	
beach	restoration	in	their	area	of	operation,	in	addition	to	comply-
ing	with	regulatory	by-	catch	mitigation	measures.	These	measures	
may	improve	the	image	of	the	company	with	the	general	public,	but	
to	avoid	accusations	of	“greenwashing”,	their	effectiveness	needs	to	
be	properly	scrutinized	(Bull	et	al.,	2016).	Transparently	embedding	
these	types	of	actions	within	a	mitigation	hierarchy	such	as	we	are	
proposing	 and	 critically	 evaluating	 their	 contribution	 to	 increasing	
the	population	growth	rate	(as	per	Equation	1),	would	be	one	way	to	
prompt	such	scrutiny.
4.6 | Uncertainty
The	 nature	 of	 the	 uncertainties	 surrounding	 biology	 and	 enforce-
ment	 in	 the	marine	 setting	 raises	questions	 about	 the	ordering	of	
steps	 in	 the	mitigation	hierarchy,	 in	a	way	 that	 is	dissimilar	 to	 ter-
restrial	systems	where	the	hierarchy	of	uncertainties	may	be	clearer	
and	uncertainty	is	generally	lower.	For	example,	it	may	be	that	the	
impact	on	overall	population	growth	rate	of	an	offset	measure	like	
eradicating	 invasive	species	 from	a	seabird	nesting	habitat	 is	both	
less	 uncertain	 and	 more	 cost-	effective	 than	 avoidance	 measures	
such	as	closing	areas	which	may	or	may	not	be	frequented	by	adult	
seabirds	 in	 a	 given	 time-	period.	Generally,	 though,	 it	might	be	 as-
sumed	that	measures	which	target	life	stages	subject	to	high	levels	
of	natural	mortality,	or	within	which	individual	contribution	to	over-
all	population	growth	rate	is	low	(e.g.	headstarting	juvenile	turtles)	
may	be	less	effective	in	achieving	NNL	than	measures	which	target	
reproductively	mature	adult	females	(such	as	live	releases;	Heppell,	
Crowder,	&	Crouse,	1996).	However,	before	implementing	an	offset	
that	aims	to	improve	the	survival	of	one	lifestage	in	order	to	com-
pensate	for	the	by-	catch	mortality	of	another,	a	robust	assessment	
of	the	consequences	(with	associated	uncertainties)	should	be	car-
ried	 out	 through	 detailed	 population	 modelling,	 based	 on	 strong	
empirical	studies	(c.f.	Wallace,	Heppell,	Lewison,	Kelez,	&	Crowder,	
2008).	In	terrestrial	systems,	the	requirement	sequentially	to	apply	
the	mitigation	hierarchy	is	broadly	unchallenged,	but	actually	similar	
arguments	 apply.	 For	 example,	 habitat	 restoration	 sits	 above	 off-
setting	in	the	hierarchy,	and	yet	it	is	a	long-	term,	uncertain	process,	
which	may	in	some	circumstances	be	much	less	preferable	to	an	off-
set	using	a	well-	established	approach	which	is	highly	likely	to	lead	to	
conservation	gains.
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4.7 | Temporal considerations
The	timing	of	offsets	in	relation	to	other	elements	of	the	mitigation	
hierarchy	has	been	the	subject	of	debate	within	the	terrestrial	litera-
ture.	The	main	suggestion	for	addressing	the	temporary	loss	of	bio-
diversity	while	offsets	come	to	fruition	has	been	adopting	mitigation	
banking,	whereby	offsets	are	implemented	in	advance	of	potentially	
damaging	activities,	providing	biodiversity	credits	which	can	be	used	
to	compensate	for	later	losses.	This	both	removes	an	element	of	un-
certainty	from	the	offset	implementation	and	reduces	the	time	lag	
between	loss	and	gain	(Mann,	2015).	With	respect	to	marine	mega-
fauna	by-	catch,	flexibility	in	timing	provides	additional	scope	for	cost	
reduction	 and	 benefit	 enhancement	which	may	 not	 be	 present	 in	
traditional	habitat-	based	terrestrial	offsets.	For	example,	temporary	
measures	such	as	a	short-	term	by-	catch	tax	to	fund	an	offset	may	be	
used	if	mitigation	or	avoidance	methods	take	time	to	come	online,	
or	if	a	temporary	nudge	is	enough	to	cause	behavioural	change.	This	
might	be	the	case	if	a	policy	was	needed	to	induce	fishers	to	take	up	
new	gear	to	avoid	the	cost	of	an	offset,	or	if	concerns	about	safety	or	
yield	reductions	during	the	transition	to	new	gear	could	be	allayed	by	
a	temporary	subsidy	for	early	adopters	or	a	paid	participatory	moni-
toring	programme	to	 inform	wider	 implementation	(e.g.	the	mobu-
lid	and	shark	case-	studies	in	Table	3).	Just	as	for	habitat	restoration	
(Zedler	&	Callaway,	 1999),	 by-	catch	offset	 strategies	which	 target	
juvenile	stages	of	 long-	lived	species	 (e.g.	 turtle	headstarting	or	 in-
vasive	 removal	 from	seabird	nesting	 islands)	may	 take	many	years	
for	 their	 effects	 to	 become	 apparent	 in	 an	 increase	 in	 population	
growth	rates.	Additional	uncertainty	is	introduced	by	the	difficulty	
in	monitoring	populations	of	many	by-	catch	 species	 (e.g.	 seabirds;	
Hatch,	2003),	leading	to	uncertain	estimates	of	the	impact	of	offset	
activities	on	population	growth	(see	case-	studies	in	Table	3).	These	
problems	are	not	 insuperable,	however;	positive	trends	have	been	
reported	in	turtle	populations	over	decades	as	a	result	of	nest	pro-
tection	(e.g.	Dutton,	Dutton,	Chaloupka,	&	Boulon,	2005).
5  | USING INCENTIVES TO REDUCE BY- 
C ATCH
Many	of	the	examples	and	principles	discussed	above	either	implic-
itly	or	explicitly	relate	to	the	economic,	social,	institutional	or	moral	
incentives	operating	on	different	actors	inside	and	outside	the	fish-
ery,	which	can	be	positive	or	negative.	We	now	turn	to	a	discussion	
of	how	incentives	can	be	used	to	reduce	by-	catch	within	our	frame-
work.	Incentives	can	be	put	in	place	to	change	fisher	behaviour	with	
respect	to	any	of	the	elements	of	the	framework	 (avoid,	minimize,	
remediate	and	offset;	Table	3).	Although	discussed	in	the	literature,	
most	of	 these	 incentive	 approaches	 are	 yet	 to	be	 implemented	 in	
the	 real	world,	particularly	 for	by-	catch.	Therefore,	until	 empirical	
evidence	of	their	effectiveness	is	available,	these	suggestions	come	
with	a	caveat.
Financial	 costs	of	by-	catch	mitigation	actions	 can	arise,	 for	 in-
stance,	from	lost	catch,	capital	investments	in	new	gear	or	mitigation	
equipment,	or	 the	 loss	of	access	to	a	fishery.	Costs	may	also	arise	
from	the	deployment	of	by-	catch	observers	or	training	in	the	use	of	
new	gear.	These	costs	can	be	paid	by	fishing	companies	or	individ-
uals,	or	by	governments,	NGOs	or	seafood	consumers.	Whether	or	
not	compensation	for	costs	incurred	by	fishers	is	seen	as	appropri-
ate	depends	on	whether	by-	catch	reduction	is	seen	as	a	social	good	
that	fishers	are	providing	(in	which	case	they	should	be	compensated	
for	it),	or	as	putting	right	the	harm	that	they	are	doing	to	biodiver-
sity	while	generating	their	own	private	gain	(in	economic	language,	
whether	by-	catch	is	viewed	as	an	unpriced	externality,	in	which	case	
they	should	pay).	It	also	depends	on	whether	economic	hardship	will	
ensue;	a	case	for	compensation	of	by-	catch	reduction	costs	incurred	
by	people	dependent	on	 fishing	 for	 their	 livelihoods	may	be	more	
sympathetically	received	by	other	actors	than	a	case	made	by	a	large	
multinational	fishing	company.
If	by-	catch	is	seen	as	an	unpriced	externality,	it	might	be	socially	
optimal	to	tax	fishers	for	their	by-	catch	so	that	this	externality	is	in-
ternalized.	This	places	an	explicit	price	upon	by-	catch	(Boyce,	1996;	
Pascoe	et	al.,	2010;	Squires	&	Garcia,	2014).	The	by-	catch	price	 is	
likely	 to	 be	 incorporated	 into	 the	 price	 of	 the	 target	 species,	 and	
thereby	becomes	part	of	the	target	species	cost.	This	price	could	be	
set	 differently	 for	 different	 demographic	 classes	of	 the	by-	caught	
species,	 depending	 on	 the	 impact	 the	 loss	 of	 an	 individual	would	
have	on	the	population.	All	else	being	equal,	putting	a	price	on	by-	
catch	means	 that	 the	seafood	product	 that	 is	 the	 target	catch	be-
comes	more	expensive	and	consumers	have	 to	pay	more	 for	 their	
seafood,	reducing	demand.	Then,	in	principle,	every	firm	in	the	sup-
ply	chain,	every	vessel	and	every	consumer	have	an	incentive	to	re-
duce	by-	catch	until	each	economic	actor’s	marginal	cost	of	by-	catch	
reduction	equals	 the	common	price	of	by-	catch	 that	 they	all	 face.	
Offsets	are	one	way	to	price	and	internalize	the	by-	catch	externality	
cost.	If	an	offsetting	action	is	costly	to	implement	and	must	be	paid	
for	with	 each	 unit	 of	 by-	catch,	 it	 implicitly	 prices	 the	 residual	 by-	
catch.	 In	 this	 circumstance,	 the	 effect	 from	 a	 financial	 standpoint	
is	the	same	as	a	by-	catch	tax,	with	the	 level	set	based	on	the	cost	
of	the	offset.	Various	institutional	structures	to	support	this	charge	
per	unit	of	by-	catch	are	possible,	with	different	implications	in	terms	
of	the	distribution	of	costs	and	benefits.	For	example,	an	insurance	
scheme	could	be	paid	into	by	fishers	that	pays	out	in	the	event	of	a	
by-	catch	event,	thereby	spreading	the	cost	of	unavoidable,	rare,	by-	
catch	events.	Or	a	tradable	permit	scheme	could	operate,	such	that	
fishers	who	experience	a	by-	catch	event	can	buy	a	permit,	with	the	
cost	varying	depending	on	demand	for	permits	 (hence	providing	a	
vessel-	level	incentive	to	innovate	to	reduce	by-	catch).
If	 there	 is	demand	for	conservation	 in	an	 international	market,	
then	 price	 premiums	 and	 market	 access	 (through	 eco-	labelling,	
supply	 chain	 certification,	 other	 food	 sustainability	 campaigns;	
Ward	&	Phillips,	2010),	or	boycotts	acting	as	strategic	threats	from	
consumers	 (Kotchen,	 2013;	 Segerson,	 2010),	 could	 act	 as	 positive	
or	negative	economic	 levers	on	the	 fishery,	providing	an	 incentive	
for	 fishers	 to	 reduce	 their	 by-	catch	 voluntarily	 (as	 has	 been	 sug-
gested	 for	 the	 Brazilian	mahi-	mahi	 fishery;	 Table	3).	 For	 example,	
the	Marine	 Stewardship	Council	 now	 includes	by-	catch	mitigation	
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in	their	certification	process	(MSC	2014).	Demand-	led	levers	may	be	
more	or	less	applicable	at	different	levels	in	the	hierarchy;	for	exam-
ple,	avoidance	may	be	relatively	hard	to	evidence,	while	offsetting	
may	be	less	easy	to	sell	to	a	consumer	than	minimization	or	reme-
diation.	Concerns	 about	 the	 unintended	 consequences	 of	 positive	
incentives	 (particularly	for	direct	subsidies,	rather	than	conditional	
incentives)	may	determine	whether	they	are	an	appropriate	instru-
ment	in	a	given	case.	For	example,	they	may	be	inappropriate	if	there	
is	a	risk	that	the	additional	money	is	reinvested	in	increased	fishing	
capacity,	or	 if	there	may	be	consumption,	production	or	conserva-
tion	leakages	(transfer	of	the	problem	somewhere	else),	whether	at	
the	 vessel,	 fishery	 or	 trans-	national	 level.	High	 transactions	 costs	
may	also	limit	the	benefits	of	incentives	schemes.
Other	changes	which	may	need	to	be	incentivized	for	successful	
implementation	of	by-	catch	reduction	policies	may	be	less	amenable	
to	financial	measures,	at	least	partly	because	it	is	less	clear	how	to	
assign	 financial	 value	 to	 the	actions,	or	 to	 the	benefits	 and	 losses	
which	they	produce.	For	example,	perceived	reductions	in	safety	for	
fishing	crews	(from	weighted	longlines,	for	 instance)	are	costs	that	
may	be	hard	to	value	financially.	Other	prerequisites	for	 long-	term	
sustainable	 behaviour	 change,	 such	 as	 changes	 in	 social	 norms	 so	
that	fishing	communities	see	by-	catch	reduction	as	appropriate	be-
haviour,	or	technical	skill	acquisition	so	that	they	can	use	new	meth-
ods,	may	be	incentivized	by	carefully	designed	interventions	working	
with	fishers	(Hall	et	al.,	2007).	Conservation	policies	based	on	eco-
nomic	 incentives	 (extrinsic	motivation)	 are	 not	 always	 superior	 to	
those	based	upon	 intrinsic	motivation.	 In	fact,	 incentive-	based	by-	
catch	 reduction	 policy	 instruments	 could	 even	 be	 counterproduc-
tive	by	reducing	the	effectiveness	of	intrinsic	motivation,	depending	
upon	 the	 situation	 (although	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 on	 this	 topic	
is	weak;	 Rode,	Gómez-	Baggethun,	&	Krause,	 2015).	 If	 the	 change	
required	for	by-	catch	reduction	to	work	meets	cultural	 resistance,	
then	participatory	 research	might	be	especially	effective	 in	break-
ing	down	barriers	between	those	who	want	by-	catch	reduction	to	
take	place	and	those	who	actually	have	to	implement	it	(the	fishers).	
For	example,	in	Australia,	the	government-	funded	body	Oceanwatch	
facilitates	engagement	between	communities,	 the	fishing	 industry,	
seafood	 suppliers	 and	 government	 to	 improve	 knowledge	 sharing	
(www.oceanwatch.org.au).	Innovation	is	crucial	in	fisheries,	and	fish-
ers	are	accustomed	to	adopting	new	technology	or	processes,	po-
tentially	making	an	 incentivized	participatory	 research	programme	
especially	fruitful.
Sometimes	 the	 most	 efficient	 way	 to	 solve	 problems	 is	 a	 so-
cial	 instrument	or	an	 institutional	change	 in	place	of,	or	as	well	as,	
an	 economic	 instrument.	 For	 example,	 supporting	 development	
of	 fisher	organizations	 rather	 than	 instituting	 a	 vessel-	level	 tax	or	
subsidy	 might	 provide	 the	 impetus	 needed	 to	 change	 behaviour.	
Instituting	catch	shares	(individual	transferable	quotas)	may	provide	
an	enabling	environment	for	by-	catch	reduction,	for	example	by	pro-
moting	more	effective	monitoring	(Grimm	et	al.,	2012).	Experience	
in	 terrestrial	 system	 produces	 similar	 insights;	 incentive-	based	
schemes	which	also	build	community	cohesion	and	support	the	de-
velopment	 or	 strengthening	 of	 local	management	 institutions,	 are	
more	 effective	 in	 the	 longer	 run	 than	 direct	 economic	 incentives	
(Clements	et	al.,	2010).
6  | CONCLUSIONS
The	 framework	 we	 present	 here	 is	 novel.	 It	 draws	 upon	 and	 ex-
tends	 the	 frameworks	 for	 conceptualizing	 by-	catch	 developed	 by	
Hall	 (1996)	 and	 Hall,	 Alverson,	 and	Metuzals	 (2000).	 It	 amalgam-
ates	Hall’s	 framework	with	 the	mitigation	hierarchy	as	used	 in	 the	
Environmental	 Impact	 Assessment	 literature	 (BBOP	 2012).	 The	
suggestions	 about	 goals,	 metric	 and	mitigation	 actions	 are	 drawn	
from	the	empirical	by-	catch	literature,	and	the	issues	we	discuss	in-
tegrate	the	concerns	of	the	extensive	terrestrial	and	nascent	marine	
offsetting	 literature	 with	 the	 by-	catch	 literature.	 The	 framework	
makes	clear	 that	an	early,	crucial,	 step	 is	 to	clarify	 the	goal	of	any	
by-	catch	 reduction	 policy.	Overarching	 goals,	 like	 those	 issued	 by	
the	Convention	on	Biological	Diversity	(e.g.	Aichi	Target	11	that	10%	
of	marine	habitat	should	be	under	protection	by	2020),	need	to	be	
translated	into	operational	terms	within	each	fishery.	Currently,	leg-
islated	or	agreed	by-	catch	 reduction	goals	 tend	 to	be	 less	 specific	
than	they	could	be,	and	this	leads	to	problems	in	interpreting	these	
goals	 in	order	to	plan	a	by-	catch	mitigation	strategy	(see	the	case-	
studies	 in	Table	3	 for	 examples).	 This	 ambiguity	 is	 to	be	 expected	
within	negotiated	targets,	but	it	is	a	challenge	nonetheless	(Maxwell	
et	al.,	2015).	Using	a	common	unit	of	by-	catch	 impact,	such	as	the	
ΔλT	which	we	use	here,	would	be	helpful	both	in	clarifying	expecta-
tions,	and	evaluating	the	effectiveness	of	elements	of	the	mitigation	
hierarchy.
Once	 the	 by-	catch	 goal	 is	 known,	 options	 for	 implementing	
avoidance,	minimization,	remediation	and	offsets	can	be	clarified	(as	
in	Table	2).	However,	outside	of	 the	 interconnected	biology	of	 the	
ecosystem,	by-	catch	 is	embedded	within	social	and	economic	sys-
tems.	Different	units	of	analysis	may	be	needed	at	different	 levels	
of	the	hierarchy,	to	cope	with	the	challenges	of	incomplete	overlap	
between	 jurisdictional	 units,	 fisheries,	 target	 stocks	 and	 by-	catch	
stocks.	Jurisdictional	issues	are	important	and	complex,	potentially	
impeding	 implementation.	Fleets	 interact,	 raising	the	risk	of	policy	
leakage,	for	example	if	people	shift	to	other	fisheries,	gear	or	liveli-
hoods.	Therefore,	the	scale	at	which	each	element	of	the	mitigation	
hierarchy	is	implemented	is	likely	to	vary,	with	incentives	to	mitigate	
often	being	best	 applied	at	 the	vessel	 level,	 focussed	on	 reducing	
individual	mortality,	while	offsetting	is	implemented	at	the	scale	of	
the	by-	catch	species’	stock.	With	transboundary	species,	unilateral	
conservation	in	one	jurisdiction	creates	the	potential	for	production,	
trade	 and	 conservation	 leakages.	 For	 example,	 a	 conserving	 State	
could	implement	the	avoidance	step	and	shut	down	or	dramatically	
curtail	its	own	production	of	swordfish	to	reduce	sea	turtle	by-	catch,	
but	the	knock-	on	effect	may	be	more	importation	of	swordfish	from	
fleets	with	higher	sea	turtle	by-	catch	(Rausser,	Hamilton,	Kovach,	&	
Stifter,	2009).
Translating	the	framework	from	a	species	to	an	ecosystem	level	
will	 require	 consideration	 of	 the	 potential	 interactions	 between	
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by-	catch	mitigation	approaches	targeted	at	different	species	(Serafy	
et	al.,	 2012).	 Actions	 to	 mitigate	 by-	catch	 for	 one	 group	 of	 spe-
cies	 can	 increase	 or	 decrease	 it	 for	 others,	 and	 so	 a	 system-	wide	
approach	 is	needed.	For	example,	 changing	 from	J-	hooks	 to	circle	
hooks	to	reduce	mortality	of	turtles	may	decrease	or	increase	shark	
mortality	(Andraka	et	al.,	2013;	Godin,	Carlson,	&	Burgener,	2012).	
In	 terrestrial	 systems,	 similar	 interactions	 arise,	 and	 value	 judge-
ments	are	made	(whether	explicitly	or	implicitly)	as	to	what	loss	and	
gain	 of	 “biodiversity”	 translates	 to	 in	 operational	 terms,	 and	what	
elements	of	biodiversity	matter	most	to	implementers.
Uncertainty	 is	 high	 in	 ocean	 ecosystems,	 creating	 both	 chal-
lenges	and	opportunities	in	applying	the	concept	of	NNL	through	a	
mitigation	hierarchy	that	includes	offsetting.	In	particular,	for	marine	
megafauna,	there	is	high	uncertainty	in	the	processes	linking	any	el-
ement	of	the	mitigation	hierarchy	through	to	changes	in	population	
growth	rate.	Furthermore,	 impacts	can	be	long-	term,	hard	to	mea-
sure	and	spatially	diffuse,	and	uncertainty	is	not	predictably	spread	
through	the	hierarchy.	This	creates	a	different	set	of	challenges	to	
those	faced	in	terrestrial	systems,	where	at	least	for	some	types	of	
environmental	impact,	the	links	between	action	and	impact	are	rel-
atively	direct	and	measurable,	and	uncertainty	generally	 increases	
through	the	mitigation	hierarchy	 (from	avoid	through	minimize/re-
mediate	to	offset).
By-	catch	 reduction	 measures	 have	 had	 significant	 successes	
over	the	last	decades,	as	a	result	of	substantial	investment	of	time	
and	 funding	 by	 researchers,	 management	 authorities,	 conserva-
tion	organizations	and	fishers	(Cox	et	al.,	2007).	However,	this	suc-
cess	is	not	universal.	Just	as	for	any	fisheries	management	issue,	
a	poor	regulatory	regime,	limited	compliance	and	lack	of	informa-
tion	hamper	efforts	to	reduce	by-	catch.	In	some	places,	high	levels	
of	by-	catch,	 limited	options	 for	mitigation	and	weak	governance	
(leading	to	poor	enforcement)	can	combine	to	make	the	by-	catch	
problem	intractable.	Our	framework	will	not	solve	these	problems.	
However,	 it	brings	 together	 the	 full	 range	of	approaches	 for	by-	
catch	mitigation	in	a	structured	and	systematic	way,	which	requires	
a	target	to	be	expressed	against	which	outcomes	can	be	evaluated.	
By	exposing	areas	of	uncertainty	and	data	deficiency,	it	could	chal-
lenge	scientists	and	managers	to	obtain	the	data	required	properly	
to	evaluate	 the	effectiveness	of	mitigation	measures.	This	 could	
then	support	and	encourage	clearer	decision-	making	and	prioriti-
zation	of	actions.	Our	framework	demonstrates	that	the	principle	
of	 implementing	 the	goal	of	no	net	 loss	 through	a	mitigation	hi-
erarchy	 is	as	applicable	 to	marine	megafauna	by-	catch	as	 to	 ter-
restrial	 systems,	 where	 it	 is	 already	 widely	 used	 in	 challenging,	
data-	poor,	circumstances.
There	 is	untapped	potential	 for	cost-	effective	by-	catch	mitiga-
tion,	which	could	be	realized	with	the	adoption	of	this	framework,	
and	with	consideration	of	new	approaches	to	incentivizing	by-	catch	
mitigation	within	the	steps	of	the	hierarchy.	Applying	it	to	a	few	case-	
studies	in	practice	will	demonstrate	empirically	where	and	how	the	
potential	for	improved	effectiveness	could	best	be	realized.	Existing	
legal	frameworks	often	preclude	approaches	which	implicitly	or	ex-
plicitly	 permit	 by-	catch,	 including	 the	 use	 of	 economic	 incentives	
or	new	approaches	such	as	offsets.	However,	in	this	context	of	dy-
namic	uncertainty,	the	dividends	of	thinking	more	creatively	about	
by-	catch	mitigation	could	be	high.
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